# EVIDENCE FILE #1 — STARK Corporation: The Numbers
### Digested from the audited consolidated financial statements for the year ended 31 December 2022 (B.E. 2565)
**Company:** บริษัท สตาร์ค คอร์เปอเรชั่น จำกัด (มหาชน) — Stark Corporation PCL (SET: STARK)
**Source document:** FINANCIAL_STATEMENTS.XLSX (filed 2023). All figures in **Thai Baht millions (฿M)** unless stated. "Restated" = ปรับใหม่ (the prior year was retroactively corrected).

> **How to read this file (for the investigator):** STARK reported itself as a fast-growing cable champion. The restated statements below are what the numbers looked like *after* the auditors forced corrections. Your job is to find the things that do not add up. Each 🚩 is a discoverable clue. The *confirmation* of what these clues mean lives in Evidence File #2 (the auditor's report). Don't peek until you've formed a theory.

---

## 1. The headline story management told (Income Statement / งบกำไรขาดทุน)

| Line (TH / EN) | FY2022 | FY2021 *(restated)* |
|---|---:|---:|
| รายได้จากการขาย — Revenue from sales | 23,289.5 | 17,486.6 |
| รายได้จากการให้บริการ — Service revenue | 1,923.7 | 1,568.5 |
| **รวมรายได้ — Total revenue** | **25,275.3** | **19,116.4** |
| ต้นทุนขาย — Cost of sales | (23,367.0) | (20,194.4) |
| ผลขาดทุนด้านเครดิตที่คาดว่าจะเกิดขึ้น — Expected credit loss (ECL) | (1,242.6) | (555.1) |
| ค่าใช้จ่ายอื่น — Other expenses | (2,230.7) | (85.0) |
| ต้นทุนทางการเงิน — Finance costs | (1,427.7) | (943.1) |
| **(ขาดทุน)สำหรับปี — Net loss for the year** | **(6,651.1)** | **(5,989.3)** |
| (ขาดทุน)ต่อหุ้น — Loss per share (฿) | (0.5393) | (0.5010) |

🚩 **RED FLAG 1 — "Growth" with no profit.** Sales jumped **+33%** year-on-year, yet in 2022 the cost of sales (฿23,367M) was *higher than the entire sales revenue* (฿23,289M). A cable maker that loses money on every baht of product it "sells" is either terribly run — or not really selling.

🚩 **RED FLAG 2 — The prior year was rewritten.** FY2021 is marked *restated (ปรับใหม่)*. STARK had originally filed FY2021 (with a **clean audit opinion**) showing a **+฿2,795M profit** and **+฿6,591M of equity**. After PwC's correction the same year became a **(฿5,989M) loss** with **negative ฿2,845M equity** — an **฿8,784M swing on profit** and a **฿9,436M swing on equity**. A reversal that size in a re-filed year is one of the loudest alarms in forensic accounting. **→ See Exhibit #4 (Claimed vs. Actual) for the full side-by-side.**

---

## 2. The tell that breaks the story: cash (Cash Flow / งบกระแสเงินสด)

| Line | FY2022 | FY2021 *(restated)* |
|---|---:|---:|
| เงินสดสุทธิ(ใช้ไปใน)กิจกรรมดำเนินงาน — **Net cash from OPERATING activities** | **(4,629.9)** | **(1,207.2)** |
| เงินสดสุทธิใช้ไปในกิจกรรมลงทุน — Net cash used in investing | (862.5) | (424.3) |
| เงินสดรับจากการออกหุ้นใหม่ — Cash from new share issue | 5,580.0 | 0.0 |
| เงินสดรับจากหุ้นกู้ — Cash from bond issuance | 8,378.8 | 2,241.0 |
| เงินสดสุทธิจากกิจกรรมจัดหาเงิน — **Net cash from FINANCING** | **10,719.5** | 1,560.9 |
| เงินสดปลายปี — Cash at year end | 6,117.6 | 1,029.5 |

🚩 **RED FLAG 3 — The business consumed cash; only investors kept it alive.** Despite ฿25bn of reported "sales," operations *burned* ฿4,630M in 2022 (and ฿1,207M in 2021). Every baht of cash the company held came from **selling shares and issuing bonds** (+฿10,720M), not from customers. Real businesses with real sales collect cash. This one only collected it from the capital markets.

> **Investigator's note — the motive.** Connect Red Flag 1 + Red Flag 3: if the "sales" don't produce cash, what were the sales *for*? Follow the financing line. The fake growth made the company look creditworthy enough to raise **฿5.58bn of new equity and ฿8.38bn of bonds in a single year.**

---

## 3. Where the fiction is hiding (Balance Sheet / งบแสดงฐานะการเงิน)

| Line | 31 Dec 2022 | 31 Dec 2021 *(restated)* | 1 Jan 2021 *(restated)* |
|---|---:|---:|---:|
| ลูกหนี้การค้าและลูกหนี้อื่น — Trade & other receivables | 7,799.5 | 6,306.2 | 5,431.5 |
| สินค้าคงเหลือ — Inventory | 10,004.3 | 10,486.8 | 8,618.0 |
| เงินสด — Cash & equivalents | 6,117.6 | 1,029.5 | 1,156.0 |
| **รวมสินทรัพย์ — Total assets** | **34,162.7** | 29,877.5 | 26,747.9 |
| รวมหนี้สินหมุนเวียน — Total current liabilities | 30,721.4 | 23,719.8 | 19,690.8 |
| หุ้นกู้ (รวมส่วนถึงกำหนด) — Bonds (incl. current portion) | 10,634.1 | 2,221.7 | 0.0 |
| **รวมหนี้สิน — Total liabilities** | **38,566.3** | 32,722.4 | 23,724.0 |
| ขาดทุนสะสม — Accumulated deficit (consolidated) | (10,378.5) | (3,766.4) | +2,196.1 |
| **รวมส่วนของเจ้าของ — TOTAL EQUITY** | **(4,403.7)** | (2,844.9) | +3,023.9 |

🚩 **RED FLAG 4 — Negative equity. The company is insolvent.** Liabilities (฿38,566M) exceed assets (฿34,163M). Shareholders' equity is **negative ฿4,404M**. Current liabilities exceed current assets by **฿6,628M** — it cannot meet its short-term obligations.

🚩 **RED FLAG 5 — Receivables that never convert.** Trade receivables sit at ฿7,800M. Against FY2022 sales that's **≈113 days of sales outstanding (DSO)** and rising — while operating cash goes *more* negative. Money "owed" by customers keeps growing but never arrives. (In Evidence File #2 you'll learn why: many "customers" never received goods, and the "collections" were wired in by a related party.)

🚩 **RED FLAG 6 — Inventory that's too big and partly impossible.** Inventory of ฿10,004M is **≈156 days** of cost of sales — heavy for a copper-cable maker. The notes also reveal inventory lines with **negative physical quantities** (฿1,375M) and an unexplained year-end count shortfall of **฿1,790M** that management expensed in one lump with no explanation of which year it belonged to.

---

## 4. Single-company (parent) statements — follow the money out the door

The **separate (parent-only) financials / งบเฉพาะกิจการ** are even starker than the consolidated ones:

| Line (parent only) | FY2022 |
|---|---:|
| ขาดทุนสำหรับปี — Net loss for the year | **(15,133.9)** |
| ขาดทุนสะสม — Accumulated deficit | **(14,999.3)** |
| ค่าใช้จ่ายอื่น (ด้อยค่าเงินลงทุนในบริษัทย่อย) — Impairment of investments in subsidiaries | (13,132.2) |
| เงินให้กู้ยืมระยะยาวแก่บริษัทที่เกี่ยวข้องกัน — Long-term loans to related companies | 7,049.3 |

🚩 **RED FLAG 7 — The parent wrote off almost its entire investment in its own subsidiaries** (฿13,132M) — an admission that the businesses it "bought" (chiefly Phelps Dodge International (Thailand) and Thai Cable) were worth a fraction of book value. Meanwhile the parent had pushed **฿7,049M of fresh loans down to those same related companies** during the year — cash leaving the listed entity toward the parties at the centre of the scheme.

---

## 5. The advance-payment anomaly (from the notes & auditor's report)

In **November–December 2022**, Phelps Dodge made **advance payments to three suppliers totalling ฿10,451M — about 65% of its entire annual copper and aluminium purchases** — paid up front, in the last two months of the year.

🚩 **RED FLAG 8 — Nobody pre-pays 65% of a year's raw materials in eight weeks.** Phelps Dodge normally bought via Letters of Credit with *no* advance payment. The money did go out — but **not to the three suppliers.** It was traced to **Asia Pacific Drilling Engineering Co., Ltd.**, a company related to a major shareholder. Hold that name.

---

## 6. The auditor's verdict

- **FY2022 audited by:** PricewaterhouseCoopers ABAS Ltd. (ไพร้ซวอเตอร์เฮาส์คูเปอร์ส เอบีเอเอส) — **issued a DISCLAIMER OF OPINION** dated 16 June 2023 (i.e., "we cannot vouch for these statements at all").
- **FY2021 had been audited by a *different* firm — Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu Jaiyos** (CPA No. 7731) — which gave a clean **unqualified opinion** on 23 February 2022.

🚩 **RED FLAG 9 — The auditor switch + the disclaimer.** Deloitte signs FY2021 clean; PwC takes over for FY2022, finds the prior year was wrong by billions, and refuses to give an opinion at all. The combination — *change of auditor, massive restatement, then a disclaimer* — is the classic end-stage signature of an accounting fraud.

---

## Quick red-flag index (for the game master / quiz)
1. Sales +33% but COGS exceeds sales — growth without profit.
2. Prior year restated from profit to a ฿5.99bn loss.
3. Operating cash flow deeply negative; only financing kept cash positive.
4. Negative shareholder equity (฿-4.4bn); insolvent.
5. Receivables ≈113 days and climbing; never convert to cash.
6. Inventory ≈156 days, with ฿1,375M *negative-quantity* stock and a ฿1,790M unexplained shortfall.
7. Parent impaired ฿13.1bn of subsidiary investments while lending ฿7.0bn down to them.
8. ฿10,451M advance payments (65% of annual metal buys) in Nov–Dec, rerouted to a shareholder-related party (Asia Pacific Drilling Engineering).
9. Auditor change → multi-billion restatement → disclaimer of opinion.

*Figures rounded to ฿ millions from the filed statements. Use Evidence File #2 (auditor's report) to confirm the mechanism behind each flag, and the Case Dossier for the people and the timeline.*
